“The Responsibility to Protect is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit in order to address its four key principles to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

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This essay will examine the ethical implications of humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide and human rights atrocities. It will argue that humanitarian intervention is a principled ambition. It will also contend that it is a risky endeavour, but the international community has a moral responsibility to intervene where human rights violations occur. It will look at various cases studies of where little to intervention occurred [Rwanda], where intervention occurred [INTERFET in East Timor] and were intervention was unethical and illegal [Iraq 2003]. I will also intend to argue that during a humanitarian conflict, principles enshrined within the UN Charter must be followed. The essay will also consider whether international intervention can be dangerous given that national interests play a part in decisions to intervene, which can cause catastrophic and/or unintended consequences for citizens in the intervened state, leading to illegal military adventures. Ultimately this essay will contend that in principle, states have a “responsibility to protect” its people from atrocities and intervene when rights are violated.

 

Whether to act on a humanitarian issue should be assessed upon the basis of “likelihood, legitimacy, legality, proportionality” and policy actions along with international law should be re-fashioned to consider new and emerging threats to global security, such as non-state actors and terrorist networks. Rwanda in 1994 saw a systematic and brutal genocide in the space of less than three months. Attacks by ordinary civilians and local militia groups contributed to approximately 1 million deaths. The international response to this atrocity was lacklustre. On April 21st, 1994 The United Nations [UN] voted to reduce the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda [UNAMIR] to 270 men, a reduction of 90 percent. This action undertaken by the UN had disastrous consequences. By the time the UN configured a more measured and targeted response to address the genocide-by deploying a 5,500-man force operating under the mandate of Chapter VII, it was far too late. The crisis had already spiralled out of control. The United States wasn’t inclined to intervene in the Rwandan Genocide, due to a number of extenuating factors. For one, the Clinton administration was only willing to undertake humanitarian operations if it only met narrowly defined national interests. The constructivist argument demonstrates the complex factors that defined the Rwandan situation. By June of 1994, the situation finally saw a humanitarian response delivered, with a UN mandate delivering the French Army authority to establish humanitarian operations, with a safe zone being created in southern Rwanda. The US response was wholly insufficient, which is evident in initial reports from US intelligence agencies. After President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 6th April 1994, then Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell drafted a memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in the memo she warned that Habyarimana’s assassination could prompt an outbreak of killings, and she urged the US to enact a diplomatic response. The advice within the memo, unfortunately, was not acted upon. Former US Senator Paul Simon said “if every member of the House and Senate had received 100 letters from people back home saying we have to do something about Rwanda when the crisis was first developing, then I think the response would have been different” US foreign policy at the time was wholly ambiguous and inconsistent. For one, it was six weeks into the crisis before the US officially labelled the violence as a “genocide”. The Clinton Administration were not interested in getting involved in another intervention after the disaster of Somalia in 1992 This is known as a discussion paper was prepared by officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defence [OSD]. In the paper, OSD officials feared that a “genocide finding” could, in fact, commit the US government to do something. Therefore, the lack of enthusiasm for intervention due to a lack of national interest delayed the overall prospects of an effective, coordinated multilateral response to prevent genocide. As the late UN- Secretary-General Kofi Annan articulates “if humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica- to gross and systematic violations of our common humanity?” The Rwanda response was ineffective at preventing genocide, despite clear intelligence and prior knowledge at the possibility of systematic violence.

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Gareth Evans, a key advocate of R2P delivers an address to Chatham House, 2011

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Articles 2 [4], 51 and 42 of the UN Charter clearly set out the guidelines for intervention. It claims that members are to refrain from using any threat or use of force against the political or territorial status quo or in any other way against the principals of the UN. The East Timor crisis of 1999 proved to be a flawed yet appropriate example of when humanitarian intervention is appropriate. The multilateral response to the atrocities in East Timor involved the UN security council passing resolution 1264, which authorised the creation of a multinational peace-keeping force under a unified command structure. The aims of this force were to “protect and support the united nations in East Timor [UNAMET] in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations”. International Forces [INTERFET] were deployed to East Timor [now Timor-Leste] from September 1999 after an independence ballot was conducted, on the ballot the question was whether to become fully independent. These interventions were necessary in order to protect the rights of the East Timorese people. The Indonesian Army, furious at President Habbibe’s decision to call for the ballot in January of 1999, colluded to intimidate the population before the ballot was conducted, the collaboration between the army and militias was obvious to all observers. For one, they collectively bore responsibility for attacks upon families that were pro-independence, such as the Liquica church massacre on the 6th of April, where sixty-seven people were shot or hacked to death[6] However, it is important to consider that the firm military response only transpired after the failed initial response of multilateral organisations- such as the UN setting up a proper peace-keeping force to protect civilians. However, the response afterwards was indeed positive, with the arrival of INTERFET forces under a UN mandate. States such as Australia were pivotal in maintaining security & stability for the Timorese people. The government was well aware that militarily and politically, Australia could not undertake the operation alone. Policymakers appropriately identified that ASEAN nations would need to participate in order to enhance the legitimacy of the operation & help protect & preserve Australia’s regional relationships. A successful “coalition of the willing” was mobilised after Indonesia admitted that it could not properly maintain security and prevent atrocities- therefore accepting the admission of INTERFET.[9] A total of twenty-two states joined this coalition, however they were apprehensive and overly cautious to the risks associated with the operation.East Timor was an appropriate situation to intervene in, as massive human rights atrocities were occurring, and its right to self-determination was damaged with the annexation by Indonesia in 1976. East Timor successfully gained its independence, and the intervention proved to be pivotal in establishing the state known as Timor-Leste.

 

Additionally, the detractors of humanitarian intervention argue that intervention often threatens state sovereignty and is wholly driven by national and corporate interests. This is the case with the “liberation” of Iraq in 2003. Leading human rights lawyer Geoffrey Robinson credibility critiques the international response to Iraq, as he argues that the world should have proceeded against Sadam Hussein by not invading Iraq but by instead invoking several international law mechanisms, such as the genocide convention- which would have brought the regime of Sadam under control. Additionally, UK policy documents like the March 2002 ‘Iraq Options’ acknowledged that the threat of Weapons of mass destruction [WMDs] from Saddam was not at a greater level than it had been in the past. Many international law scholars and leading academics have questioned the legality of the war. The war undermined the foundations of international law and defied any attempt made to create consensus, they contradicted numerous security council resolutions too. For example, Security Council resolution 1441 was relied upon leaders such as then Australian PM John Howard to justify use-of-force. This resolution does not allow members of the UN to use “all necessary means”, rather affording Iraq “a final opportunity to comply” with the international inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission [UNVIMOC], it also confirmed that the matter would return to the security council if Iraq failed to comply. Even then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan called the war illegal, as it was conducted unilaterally with a “coalition of the willing”. These weapons inspections from the IAEA and the UNVIMOC failed to find any evidence of weapons of mass destruction. Henceforth, the moral justification for the use of force was dismissed by the overwhelming majority of the international community. It became increasingly evident that the US had done little planning for actually administering Iraq after it had been conquered. Iraq quickly was destabilised, due to the occupation, and also due to the targeted economic sanctions that reduced its economy by one fifth, It became increasingly clear that coalition forces were hellbent on establishing a strategic foothold in an already destabilised region. Jus ad bellum, that being the decision to go to war itself must be considered. UK & US grand strategy with intervention in Iraq is inextricably linked toward the Bush doctrine, US foreign policy that is inherently critical of international institutions like the UN through a neoconservative policy framework which dismisses the importance of multilateral co-operation. Additionally, one must examine the historical precedent of intervention, wherein 1946 at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal where it contended that “[a]ggression…is the supreme international crime”. The UN charter is in favour of resolving disputes with peaceful means and in promoting cooperation. The pre-emptive self-defence espoused by the “coalition of the willing” was fundamentally flawed. there are norms outside the UN Charter in customary international law forbidding intervention and unauthorised uses of force. Legal precedent establishes this, with the International Court of Justice finding its Nicaragua decision and by decades of state practice. Ultimately, the Iraq intervention was a fundamental violation of International law and was a negative example of intervention.

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To conclude, this essay examined the implications of international “humanitarian intervention” by looking at various cases studies where no intervention occurred [Rwanda], where multilateral peacekeeping proved effective [Interfet in East Timor] and where intervention was arguably unconscionable and illegal [Iraq in 2003]. Intervention when in accordance with the charter or approved by the UN-security council is an important endeavour to protect people from and prevent genocide and other human rights. Humanitarian intervention when executed and conducted appropriately is important, as the international community has a “responsibility to protect” individuals from severe human rights atrocities and genocides.

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Will Devine is an International Relations Student at Latrobe and Convenor of the Young Fabians.

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